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25 January 1965

NRO review(s) completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, (S) NRO STAFF

SUBJECT: Operational Responsibility and Authority

References:

- 25X1 A. Memorandum for SS-4, 9 Dec. 64, [redacted]
25X1 B. [redacted] 0551 dated 5 August 1963.
25X1 C. Memorandum for the Deputy Director (Research) CIA
15 June 1962, [redacted]
D. [redacted] 1464, dated 23 June 1964.
E. DNRO Staff Memo 9 March 64.

In Ref A you displayed surprise to learn that the STC [redacted] did not have a complete manual. In addition, you requested that I review the list of agencies possessing [redacted] manuals. To obtain the necessary policy guidance to aid making a realistic evaluation of how many copies of the manuals should be produced in the future, I believe it appropriate to review the history of the Reports Control Manual and related problems facing me as the Deputy Director for Satellite Operations on your staff.

From the inception of the CORONA Program two guiding principles of management were established and all actions taken and implementing instructions published were designed to keep intact these principles.

A. In support of operational requirements as established by the United States Intelligence Board and its subcommittees, satellite operations would be planned, directed and controlled in Washington.

B. All Programs would employ the established security principle of "need to know."

To meet operational requirements and to provide the necessary communications hold down, the reports control manual system was followed

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with individual communications slugs provided for each project. Prior to the publication of the reports control manual, meetings were held during which authoritative representatives of interested organizations, who were empowered to speak for their parent organizations, coordinated on the contents and format of the individual messages. These messages reflected acceptable procedures by members of the community to meet their management responsibilities in the (TS) NRP. Unilateral changes to the reports control manual were forbidden with complete authority for approval of changes resting in project headquarters.

In following the "need to know" principle complete copies of the reports control manual were limited to project headquarters. All field units received only message formats for the messages in which they were directly involved for either action or information. In my opinion, it doesn't serve any useful purpose for any organization to possess a complete manual unless they have management responsibilities for the project. Under the present procedure, it is our responsibility to monitor all message traffic to insure timeliness of all reports as well as adherence to proper content and format. For SAFSP to know who the NPIC team members are that are going to Eastman Kodak for product titling [redacted] for instance, appears to me to be of no useful value; if they are to get copies of this message it adds an additional strain on the communications link, especially since [redacted] are the only 24 hour communications centers in operation.

In an Agreement, Ref C, establishing the (S) NRO satellite operations office, signed by Dr. Charyk in June 1962, it says in part, "... In view of the experience gained in the operational aspects of the CORONA project, the nucleus of the satellite operations unit of the (S) NRO staff should be composed of CORONA operations personnel, and the CORONA procedures used as a general guide in the development of procedures for other (TS) NRP projects." I have always interpreted Dr. Charyk's remarks to mean that the two guiding principles stated above should be the foundations upon which all other operational principles are built.

In my opinion another outstanding management principle used in the CORONA program that made it so successful, and this success has been recognized throughout the Government, was the fact that the action officer in Washington and his counterpart on the West Coast worked for the same superior. Therefore, the complete operation including computer support and operational changes to flight hardware were under the control of one organization. In April 1963 the Satellite Operations Center was placed under the Director, (S) NRO Staff. As previously noted, it was the agreed upon principle that the successfully employed CORONA operational procedures should be adapted to meet (S) NRO requirements.

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25X1 This agreement was fully adhered to by Director (S) NRO Program B. The
25X1 direct response of the AP facility to my operational direction and requirements,
25X1 without Director (S) NRO Program B coordination, has never been questioned.
25X1 They respond to [] operational direction exactly as they do to []
25X1 technical direction. (A recent example of this is the []
25X1 However, in the [] Program it soon became apparent to me that I did
25X1 not have similar authority.

25X1 Because of the confusion associated with the definition of operational
25X1 responsibilities for [] Ref B was issued. In Part II,
25X1 Par. A, it states "NRO Satellite Operations Staff [] has responsi-
25X1 bilities for all decisions relating to the following:

25X1 (1) Contents, publication and distribution of the reports control
25X1 manual. (Changes will be coordinated with Director of NRO Program A)."

25X1 In Part II, Par. 2 (1) - The director of (S) NRO Program A has full
25X1 responsibility for "Providing necessary support of [] as may be
25X1 required to carry out [] responsibilities as stated above, following
25X1 the procedure in the reports control manual."

Although it was never made a matter of formal agreement, to my
knowledge, it was always implied that the same policy regarding operational
control and coordination of changes to the reports control manual was in
effect with Director of (S) NRO Program B for the CORONA, ARGON and
LANYARD Programs. It is my understanding that the operational manage-
ment for these Programs has never been withdrawn from Director (S) NRO
Program B.

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(c) requiring operational support from the appropriate Program Director

there must be from the Director, (S) NRO, some authority extended to the Deputy Director for Satellite Operations. Therefore, I recommend SS-4 use as its operating charter the instructions contained in par. 1 b (1) (a) of Ref E which in part states "The (S) NRO staff exists . . .

(a) To assist the Director, (S) NRO, as he requires . . ."

It is requested that the Director, (S) NRO sign the attached message which will extend through you to the Deputy Director for Satellite Operations appropriate authority to carry out the responsibilities mentioned above.

I recommend the original concept of the use of the reports control manual be continued and that distribution should be limited to those with a "need to know."



Deputy for Satellite Operations
(S) NRO Staff

25X1

1 Attachment
Proposed message

cc: DDCI

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